Have government regulations improved workplace safety? A test of the asynchronous regulatory effects in China's coal industry, 1995-2006.
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of workplace safety regulations are inconclusive. This study hypothesizes that the asynchronous effects of safety regulations occur because regulations need time to become effective. Safety regulations will work initially by reducing the most serious accidents, and later by improving overall safety performance. The hypothesis is tested by studying a provincial level aggregate panel dataset for China's coal industry using two different models with different sets of dependent variables: a fixed-effects model on mortality rate, which is defined as fatalities per 1,000 employees; and a negative binominal model on the annual number (frequency) of disastrous accidents. Safety regulations can reduce the frequency of disastrous accidents, but have not reduced mortality rate, which represents overall safety performance. Policy recommendations are made, including shifting production from small to large mines through industrial consolidation, improving the safety performance of large mines, addressing consequences of decentralization, and facilitating the implementation of regulations through carrying on institutional actions and supporting legislation. Until recently, about 4,000 coal miners perished annually in China, demonstrating that workplace safety in China's coal industry is an urgent and important issue. This research provides evidence that safety regulations have asynchronous effects and identifies the priorities in improving safety in China's current coal mining. This may assist the Chinese government to design more effective safety improvement policies and improve the effectiveness of safety regulations and safety performance.